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ABSTRACT – This paper has the aim to point out the risks of reducing the EU competitiveness by 
analyzing the indicators of price and cost competitiveness, as well as the structural and technological 
aspects of competitiveness. The influence of the world crisis on the competitiveness and export 
performances of the EU is in the focus in order to show at what extent the global downturn may have 
aggravated previously existing needs for readjustment of the functioning of the Union. Not only that 
the crisis showed that the problems in the Union were not created recently, but also it demanded 
urgent needs of new improved policy in order to regain the competitiveness strength and 
performances.  
The reformulated strategy needs to be based on openness and innovation, with investment in 
research and development. Long-term expectations are to be made comprehensive structural changes 
in order to overcome structural differences between individual Member States and to increase the 
overall competitiveness. Additionally, trade barriers are needed between individual Member States to 
be removed and higher individual and aggregate rates of economic growth are to be achieved. It is clear 
that the effects of deep integration of the EU has not yet been achieved, and expected benefits may not 
be realized, if internal and external balance of the Union is not maintained. 
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, European Union (EU) managed to hold its position on the 
world market, competing with the USA and Japan, and as well as with new rivals such as 
China and India.  But even before the crisis, the productivity growth started slowing down 
and the EU faced with the serious challenges of losing world market positions due to the loss 
of competitiveness.  
Under the term ’’competitiveness’’ in the literature can be found many different 
definitions. Generally, an economy is competitive if it does things that are likely to 
encourage economic growth. The simple measure of economic growth is the value of the 
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gross domestic product (GDP). But, if a country is increasing its GDP that would not mean 
that the country’s competitiveness has improved. For instance, if the growth is based on 
natural resources and their favorable price developments, the GDP will grow (GDP= 
quantity multiplied by prices), but the economy will not have significant improvements in 
the competitiveness. In case, the reason for the dynamics and the quality of economic growth 
is determined from the level of labor productivity, then we can make difference. In the macro 
economy it is widely accepted that the difference in labor productivity is the reason for the 
great differences in the level of economic growth in the countries in the world economy 
(Mankiw, 2010).  
Krugman (1996) has also declared that the real essence of competitiveness is reflected in 
the productivity. Still, many economists believe that not only the quantity of economic 
production is important, but also the quality of living of the people (Aiginger, 2004). That 
would mean, greater opportunities for education, healthy life, rich cultural life etc. That can 
be measured by the second indicator of economic growth, GDP per capita. Higher the GDP 
per capital means higher living standards of the population. Still, GDP per capita does not 
take into account the country’s ability to distribute the gained wealth in a fair manner (it is 
calculated on average level). Another weakness is that we can get wrong conclusion. For 
example if we have the same value of the GDP, but decreasing growth rates of population, 
we will get higher GDP per capita. 
Some authors (Haiman & Altena, 2007) find the linkages between competitiveness and 
trade (traditional theories). Popular discussion often views ‘competitiveness’ as a way to 
narrow the current account deficit of the balance of payments. That can be measured by the 
growth of the export of the market share (participation of the total value of the export in the 
total world export). The essence of this theory is compounded by openness to trade tending 
to be associated with openness to ideas. Especially for small economies, openness to trade 
should boost economic growth by increasing domestic competitive pressures (from imports) 
and allowing domestic producers access to wider markets and so economies of scale (from 
exports). Still these theories do not take into account the quality of the product or the service 
or the branding of the products. On long run, non pricing factors (structural and 
technological aspects) such as: research and development, regulatory regime and other have 
significant influence on the competitiveness of the products and of the economy.   
Finally, if we summarized all the above mentioned views, the competitiveness of one 
country can be defined as ability of the country to compete on the world market, with final 
goal to increase the wealth of the country and the living standards (Ottaviano at al., 2009).  
The definition according to the traditional theories will be applied in the context of the 
paper. In the first section, the trends in the world trade and EU trade are analyzed, from the 
creation of the European Economic Community to 2010. In the second section the discussions 
about the indicators of competitiveness will take place. The approach towards the EU 
competitiveness will be analyzed according to the traditional approaches that consider the 
successful export performance – either in terms of export growth or export market share and 
by the standard indicators of cost and price competitiveness. To determine the price 
competitiveness, the real effective exchange rate is used. Cost competitiveness is analyses by 
the ULC (unit labor costs) in manufacturing sector and consumer price deflator in order to 
see the trend of the movement of the real effective exchange rate. Also, additional data from 
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the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2013) and of Europe 2020 
Strategy will be integrated in the paper in order to give multi-dimensional concept of 
competitiveness. In order to overcome the flaws of the traditional theories in the third 
section, technological aspects and other aspects of the non-price competitiveness  of the EU 
will be elaborated. 
This paper has the aim to point out the risks of lowering the EU competitiveness. The 
influence of the world crisis on the competitiveness and export performances of the EU is in 
the focus in order to show at what extent the global downturn may have aggravated 
previously existing needs for readjustment of the functioning of the Union. Not only that the 
crisis show that the problems in the EU were not created recently, but also ask for urgent 
need of new improved policy in order to regain the competitiveness strength and 
performances.  
The methodology of this research is based on quantitative analysis. It will be presented in 
a form of time series analysis for the case of EU, concerning the period 1958-2012, and for the 
indicators of competitiveness 2000-2012 in order to point out the dependence among 
observations at different points in time. Core suppliers of the needed data will be the Euro 
stat, International Monetary Fund and UN Comtrade databases.  
The expected outcome of the research is to summaries the main reasons that contribute to 
loss of the world trade positions of the EU which will lead to conclusions about the future 
prospects of the EU and need for high productive strategy.  
Trends in the world trade and trade of the EU 
Global external imbalances widened persistently over the last several years. International 
trade flows contracted sharply in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 mainly 
due to the decline in the economic activity and aggregate demand, which was result of the 
beginning of the world economic crisis, the percentage decline of the world trade in 2009 
compared to 2008 was 22.73%  (table 1). 
 
Table 1. Annual growing rates of the world trade by region and selected economies (%) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
World  15,38% 15,24% 15,45% -22,73% 21,79% 19,54% 0,30% 
North America   11,90% 7,97% 8,83% -23,56% 22,97% 15,62% 3,54% 
South and Central 
America  21,07% 19,66% 24,51% -24,32% 27,84% 26,41% 0,61% 
Europe 14,24% 16,58% 12,41% -23,60% 12,75% 17,63% -4,87% 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 27,61% 26,10% 34,58% -35,28% 28,83% 32,69% 2,89% 
Asia   16,27% 15,23% 16,87% -18,60% 31,42% 20,09% 3,31% 
Others  21,15% 18,83% 31,00% -25,11% 24,16% 25,55% 4,80% 
European Union (27) 14,07% 16,35% 11,88% -23,62% 12,50% 17,24% -5,23% 
   Intra-trade 13,84% 16,39% 9,88% -23,54% 9,88% 15,92% -6,93% 
   Extra-trade 14,54% 16,29% 15,83% -23,76% 17,45% 19,55% -2,34% 
Source: Eurostat, Comext Database; National statistics; Global Trade Atlas; IMF,  International Financial  
Statistics. http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/quarterly_world_exp_e.htm 
   
 Makrevska Disoska, E., et al., Competitiveness of the EU, EA (2014, Vol. 47, No. 3-4, 20-34)
 
23 
Regarding the regions, the exceptional decrease was noticed in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (C.I.S) of 35.28% in 2009, while the region of Asia has the lowest 
slowdown in the volume of trade of 18,6% on annual basic. Still, the decline in the trade has 
high degree of synchronization across countries, as a result of the developed and closely 
connected financial market and transmission power of the informational technologies. 
The downfall of the total trade of EU was 23,62% in 2009 compared with 2008. The 
declining foreign demand in the wake of the 2008/09 global economic downturn hit the EU’ 
export sector particularly hard. This led to increasing concerns about the prospects for EU` 
exports and competitiveness, particularly at a time when exporters had already been 
struggling to adjust to the fiercer competition and other structural changes resulting from 
globalization. While partly reflecting the relatively high openness of the European economy, 
this has also prompted increasing concerns about the competitiveness of the Union.  
Trends in exports and imports may serve to calculate the value of the current account of 
the European Union. Trade balance of Union in the reviewed period had a mainly negative 
value , i.e. value of imports is higher than the value of export and is worsening over the last 
decade. Since 2002 the trade deficit is widening, and it reached the highest negative value in 
2008 (525,1 billion Euros). The recovery was in 2009, when the trade balance showed positive 
tendencies. According to the data from Euro stat only in the period 1993-1998, the EU 
exerted a positive trade balance (figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Trade balance of EU (billions euros/ECU) 
 
Source: Еurostat, (2011): External and intra-EU trade: A statistical yearbook, data 1958 – 2010, European 
Commission, Luxemburg,  *the data cannot be consistent on the yearly intervals because of the lack of data 
 
So far, European policymakers seem to have watched the growing imbalances without 
much concern, in the hope that the EU will be largely unaffected (Ahearne, Jürgen, 2005). 
Additionally, the trade account balance, as well as the current account balance has never 
constituted a condition for acceptance of a single currency. Even in Maastricht criteria for 
entry in the Euro zone, there are no restrictions on trade or current account deficit. Under 
Article 143 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, only countries - 
countries that have not yet adopted the euro may receive financial assistance to deal with 
have problems in the balance of payments (Treaty of the functioning of the European Union).  
The reason why the EU does not allow for funding the deficit in the trade account is 
because it is considered that no economy cannot be exposed to speculative attacks of the 
common currency. Therefore, deficits between countries that are already members of Euro 
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zone should be financed through short-term financial markets, without the need for 
intervention by the monetary authorities.  
The problem is systematic.  The trade deficit of the EU is a result from the countries that 
traditionally achieve trade surplus (Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands and Germany) 
and countries with traditionally high deficits (Greece, Portugal and Spain). However, the 
deficit in the trade account of Greece, Portugal and Spain was balanced until the mid- 1990s. 
Obviously, the process of convergence of these countries in the monetary union impacted 
negatively on the country, resulting in deepening deficit due process of adaptation to the EU. 
Just for example, the Spain balance of trade increased in 2006 approximately four times more 
compared in 1999 (Trading Economics database).   
Interesting is that the crisis created cyclical movements in the trade balance of the EU 
countries. The countries that traditionally have trade surplus, experienced lowering of the 
trade balance, and vice versa for the countries with the trade deficit. By approaching price 
and cost competitiveness this research will try to give an answer to these problems. 
Approaching price and cost competiveness of the EU  
Competitiveness of the EU as a main global trade leader is achieved by the advantages of 
the existence of the common market. The EU is the world`s largest exporter with well 
positioning in the global value chain. Still, the common market of the EU is fragmented by 
the domestic producers that do not use the advantages of the economies of scale as a result of 
not synchronized policies. With the beginning of the economic crisis, many of the structural 
weaknesses of the Union were revealed. As the private demand remain resilient and the 
public expenditure increased the internal imbalance of the Union. Slugging international 
demand and poor economic outlook limited the potential for export.  
The trends of the export of the EU is moving almost in the same direction as the total 
trade of the EU. Export growth reached its peak in 2007 with 17% annual growth, and 
experienced decline in 2009 of 23%, compared with 2008. After the short recovery the export 
showed 5% decrease in 2012 compared to the previous year.   
According to the share of the export of the EU in the world export, the relative indicator 
is slowing down (figure 2). With the exception of the period 1958-1960, the Union had the 
highest share in the value of world exports in the whole observed period. In 1996, EU  had a 
20.8% market share of the world trade in goods (excluding intra-EU). This market share has 
been lowered by competitive pressures from emerging economies, falling to 16% in 2010. The 
second largest world exporter were USА, whose share has been declining gradually since 
2000. The most remarkable development is that China as fastest growing economy from 2005 
onwards become the third largest exporter in the world, followed by Japan as the fourth 
largest world exporter. Thus, if we make comparison, we can see that the rise in the export 
share of China for 10 p.p. from 1996 to 2010, has been fairly affected by the EU (fall of 4,8 
p.p.), USA (4,6 p.p.) and Japan (3,7 p.p.) over the same period.  
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Figure 2. Participation of the countries in the total world export of goods 
 
Source:  Еurostat, (2011): External and intra-EU trade: A statistical yearbook, data 1958 – 2010, European 
Commission, Luxemburg,  *the data cannot be consistent on the yearly intervals because of the lack of data 
 
The EU's export performance varies significantly between markets. The EU shows a 
decrease in market shares on some of the most dynamic importing markets during the last 
decade. The largest gain is in the USA market, where the EU accounted for over one fifth of 
the import market in 2007. This performance coincided with shrinking shares of Japanese 
and to a lesser extent, of Canadian and ASEAN exports in the same market. Conversely, the 
EU loses market shares on the BRICs markets. The small market share loss of EU products on 
the rapidly expanding Chinese market could, however, have a large impact in the long run.  
This appears to be mainly associated with the unfavorable trends in price 
competitiveness of the EU. Measured in terms of relative export prices, European Central 
Bank estimates that the euro area price competitiveness deteriorate by around 10% between 
1999 and 2008 (ECB, 2010).  
The decrease in the price competitiveness is confirmed by the movements of the nominal 
effective exchange rate, given in figure 3. An increase of this indicator suggest an 
appreciation, which indicated lowering of the price competitiveness. The appreciation of the 
exchange rate was from 2002 to 2009, after it experienced depreciation until 2012.  The figure 
show that the Euro zone has lower price competitiveness compared with the EU as an 
economy of 27 member countries (not taking into consideration Croatia, because of the lack 
of data).  
 
Figure 3. Nominal effective exchange rate (index 2005=100) 
 
Source: European Commission,  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/competitiveness/data_section_en.htm 
* IC 36 = group of 36 industrial countries 
y = -0.0011x + 0.2067
R² = 0.1906
EU
USA
China
Japan
South Korea
EA17 vs EU27
EA17 vs IC36
EU27 vs IC36
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Still, the price competitiveness differs from country to country. High price 
competitiveness is achieved for Germany, France, Austria and Finland. Losses in price 
competitiveness is recorded in most of the countries - were at the same time experienced 
decline in the export - Estonia. Malta, Cyprus, Greece.  
The losses in market shares have coincided with a degradation of cost competitiveness, 
measured by the Unit labor costs. The rise in the real effective exchange rate indicate 
lowering of the cost competitiveness. As a consequence of the strong growth of real wages 
since 2002 in most of the countries, ULC has increased both in the EU and euro area as a 
whole (figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Real effective exchange rate (ULC) (index 2005=100) 
 
Source: European Commission, 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/competitiveness/data_section_en.htm  
 
Despite the intensive wage growth which is a long term trend, during the whole period 
from 2002-2011, the peripheral member states register high unemployment rate, which 
indicates low wage sensitivity to the unemployment movements (figure 5). Additionally the 
cyclical effect of the crisis caused losses in the labor productivity, meaning faster decline of 
output relative to employment during the slump. Between the first quarters of 2008 and 
2009, production decreased by 19% while hours worked fell by 8%. (European Commission. 
2013).  
 
Figure 5. Fluctuations in EU ULC are mainly caused by variations in labor productivity growth 
 
Source: European Commission, (2013): European Competitiveness Report 2013:Toward knowledge driven 
reindustrialization, European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2013)347 final, p.28 
EA17 vs EU27
EA17 vs IC36
EU27 vs IC36
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Therefore, as a result of the insufficient labor productivity achievements, despite the 
introduction of new technologies and good business practices, the economic growth in the 
Union was slowing down. In other words EU is not an optimal currency area, except the lack 
of wage flexibility, the EU does not have convergence in the business cycles, has low 
mobility of labor force and capital. In this regard, it can be concluded that in the event of 
economic shock, when there is no flexible foreign exchange regime and autonomous 
monetary policy in the member states, the labor mobility or wage flexibility cannot recover 
the differences among the economies in the Monetary Union (Trpeski, Kondratenko, 
Jankoski, 2013). 
Therefore there is limited potential growth of national spillovers. This argument is 
supported by the Regional Competitiveness Index (RCI) calculated by the European 
Commission, which measures the different dimensions of competitiveness at the regional 
level in EU countries. RCI reveals substantial differences in competitiveness within some 
countries. In France, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Sweden and 
Greece the level of variability across regions is particularly high. Thus, large gap in regional 
competitiveness is harmful for national competitiveness and consequently for the Union as a 
whole (The World Economic Forum, 2014).   
Non- price competitiveness 
While for most EU countries price competitiveness has been a critical factor in shaping 
relative export performance with respect to major direct competitors – most notably 
developed economies – other non price-related factors play a part. Generally, non-price 
competitiveness comprises the structural and technological aspects of competitiveness. In 
this context, factors such as research and innovation, infrastructures, as well as the 
regulatory and tax framework of a country, are critical because they affect the prospects of 
achieving higher productivity growth and thus competitiveness in the medium and longer 
term (ECB, 2010).   
The European Competitiveness Report (2013) shows that the EU has comparative 
advantages in most manufacturing sectors (15 out of 23) accounting for about three quarters 
of EU manufacturing output. They include vital high-tech and medium-high-tech sectors 
such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, vehicles, machinery, and other transport equipment 
(which includes aerospace). In the high tech sectors, the EU has comparative advantage in 
pharmaceuticals but lags behind in the rest of this broad category (computers, electronics, 
and optical equipment). Even in the medium high-tech sectors, EU comparative advantage is 
lower than for the US and Japan. More importantly, China and the other emerging industrial 
economies are quickly gaining ground in the knowledge intensive sectors and rather than 
merely assembling high-technology products they are now producing them. Even though 
the data in table 2 confirm that the China is a leader in high tech industries, still this is not a 
reliable data. It is a result of the offshore activities of the USA and EU for a low cost 
production. 
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Table 2. Comparative advantage by technology intensities in manufacturing, 2011 
 High tech Medium high tech Medium low tech Low tech 
EU 0,85 1,14 0,89 1,01 
Japan 0,73 1,59 0,86 0,16 
USA 0,88 1,22 0,96 0,68 
Brazil 0,32 0,76 0,87 2,5 
China 1,56 0,72 0,85 1,29 
India 0,4 0,49 1,93 1,33 
Russia 0,08 0,45 2,74 0,49 
            Source: UN Comtrade 
 
The type of specialization of the countries can explain the cyclical movements in the trade 
balance. Since, there is a difference between elasticity of different categories of goods and 
services, trade in services, except for transport, declined with less dynamics than trade in 
goods. In the trade in goods investment good register the greatest reduction. Contrary to 
these trends, the trade of traditional “un cyclical” sectors, such as food, beverages and 
pharmaceutical products, was far more resilient.  
Consequently, countries that entered the global economic crisis with large trade deficits 
had a significant improvement in the condition of the trade account during the 2008 - 2010. 
Countries that had substantial trade surpluses had note lowering of the positive balance in 
the trade. This suggests that the decline in trade surplus of the countries that traditionally 
generate a positive trade balance (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and Netherland) is due 
to the elasticity of world demand for capital intensive products and investment goods, in 
which these countries are highly specialized. Conversely, countries with trade deficits 
(Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovenia and Finland) that have high specialization in consumer 
goods, had slightly reduced exports due to the global “un elasticity” demand (Mauro, Foster, 
Lima, 2010).  
These developments are cyclical, i.e. they are occurring due to the impact of the economic 
cycle in which the world economy is. Thus, after the crisis, current trends in the trade 
balance will be present again. Consequently, the existence of different economic structures of 
the countries is a systemic problem for the Union . Although it can be equated with the 
imbalance globally, there is a significant difference. Globally, the adjustment are achieved 
through exchange rate movements, while within the monetary union (such as the EU) that 
must be achieved through fiscal adjustment and coordination of policies within the member 
countries (Mrak, 2010).  
We believe that decreased labor productivity of the Union is important and influence 
negatively not only for price, but also for non-price competitiveness. Labor productivity, and 
especially multi-factor productivity, is often seen as indicator of technical progress. Increased 
labour productivity means more output is produced with less labor, which can be due to 
technological or organizational improvements and other non-observable factors.  
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Reasons behind loss of the EU competitiveness 
In order to explain why European growth came down from the extraordinary levels it 
reached during the Golden Age (1950-1973), and most importantly the technological lagging 
of EU behind USA we will compare the indicators of labor productivity and labor input 
between EU and USA.  
 
Table 3. Levels of EU-15 relative to the USA, in PPP, (USA=100) 
 1950 1973 1995 2004 
GDP per capita 45,5 76,8 74,9 74,1 
GDP per working hour (labor productivity) 39,5 75,4 98,3 90,3 
Working hours per head of population (labor input) 115,2 101,9 76,2 82,1 
Source: Ark, van B., O’Mahony, M., Timmer, P. M., (2008) "The Productivity Gap between Europe and the 
United States: Trends and Causes", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 22, Number 1, Pages 25–44 
 
According to the numbers in the table 3, the problem is ascribed entirely to a relative fall 
in labor input (from index of 115,2 in 1950 to 76,2 in 1995 and 82,2 in 2004 compared with the 
USA). The reason for this is:  
a) the ratio of population of employed to the population of working age is higher in 
USA 74% (OECD database) compared with EU of 68% (Euro stat database) . The 
data shows that are that employment rate (age group 20-64) is still below the 
objectives set in "Europe 2020" of 75% of the population. 
b) The structure of the working population has aged considerably in recent decades. 
Between the 1960 and 2000 the average dependency ratio (defined as number of 
persons aged 60 or more years per 100 persons aged 15-59 years) for the EU-15 
rose from 26 to 35. At the same time, the dependency ratio for the United States 
remained almost constant at around 25. During the period 1995-2015, the 
population above the standard retirement age, 65 years, will increase by 17 
million (30%). Within this group the very old, those over 80, will increase by 5.5 
million or 39% (Blanchard, 2004). 
c) fall of the utilization rate of labor in Europe compared with USA which is a result 
of the sustainable preference for leisure due to the higher social protection of the 
workers and also by the labor rigidness of the European market.  
Taking into consideration that the average hours worked are much shorter in EU and the 
employment rate is much lower compared with the USA, we can get artificially boosted 
indicator of the productivity. As the data show the productivity in EU did not decrease, just 
opposite the index GDP per working hour increase from 75,4 in 1975 to 98,3 in 1995. Then 
decreased to 90,3 in 2004, but still remain below USA (index=100) (table 2). This indicator 
should be revised in order to compare the real productivity gap between EU and USA. 
According to Cette (2004), the European productivity level should be revised downwards, 
which suggest that the productivity gap between EU and USA remain substantial.  
The main turning point for widening the productivity gap is considered to be since 1995. 
Taking into account indicators of annual productivity growth, in the USA, average annual 
labor productivity growth accelerated from 1.2 percent during the period 1973–95 to 2.3 
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percent during 1995–2006. Comparing the same two time periods, annual labor productivity 
growth in the European Union declined from 2.4 to 1.5 percent (Ark, O’Mahony, Timmer, 
2008). In the mid-1990s, there was a burst of higher productivity in industries producing 
information and communications technology equipment (ICT), and a capital-deepening 
effect from investing in information and communications technology assets across the 
economy. In turn, these changes were driven by the rapid pace of innovation in information 
and communications technologies, fuelled by the precipitous and continuing fall in 
semiconductor prices. Europe has been lagging behind the USA not only in ICT investment 
but also in total productivity growth in ICT producing as well as ICT - using industries. 
Practically, the period of the two oil shocks 1973-’74 and 1978-’79 marked the end of the 
fast growing industries like chemical and automotive industry, production of plastics and 
artificial fibers, which have been the main driving force of economic growth in the postwar 
period. For thirty years, between 1950 and 1973 Europe enjoyed a “Golden age” of growth, 
stability and social cohesion. 
All industries were replaced by new industrial sectors with high added value, such as 
electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, computer technology and telecommunications. 
Although newly industrialized economies-Japan and "economies - tigers" of Southeast Asia, 
at that time were trying to increase the competitiveness of these industries, especially 
electronic, still in the information technology products and bio pharmaceutical products 
USA, had a big competitive advantage (Dyker, 1999). 
Also, EU is lagging in the investment in research and development (R&D). According to 
the objectives set out by the European Commission (2010a), "Europe 2020", each EU should 
consider costs for R&D to be amounted 3 % of its national GDP (same as in the Lisbon 
strategy). In the period 1995 - 2010, the cost of R&D calculated as a percentage of GDP in the 
EU and the euro area are relatively fixed, and moving with an average value of 1.8 % of 
GDP, which is below the set limit.  
EU and the euro area have only a higher spending rate on R&D than China. Within the 
EU, only Sweden and Finland with 3.7 % exceeding the target. Other countries that have a 
higher than average rate of union are: Germany (2.69 %) and Denmark (2.85 %). In 2008, 
Japan had the highest percentage of allocation of 3.45 %, followed by South Korea with 3.36 
% and 2.76 % in the USA. South Korea has significant rise in the cost during the reporting 
period. 
It seems that the Lisbon strategy for making the EU the world’s most competitive 
economy is a failure. Still, an extension of the failed approach is in the works. After Lisbon 
strategy, The Europe 2020 strategy has emerged with some principle tasks, but central ideas 
of the Lisbon Strategy have been kept. The Lisbon answer has been the “open method of 
coordination. It was to aim at the middle ground, where key policy domains remain a 
national competence but are recognized as being of common interest. EU continue with the 
Lisbon-type reforms and  developed new instruments of economic governance, especially 
with the beginning of the economic crisis.  
Some authors (Wyplosz, 2010) state that Lisbon strategy should die a peaceful death and 
that a brand new model is needed. We believe that the model is adequate, even though there 
is no explicit productivity growth target formulated in the Europe 2020 strategy, but trends 
in labor productivity are monitored as one of its main indicators. The countries from EU 
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need to find their own ways of adjusting to the opportunities and dislocations of the new 
information and communications technologies. We believe that large extent of the reforms 
should remain under the member states` authority, which can bring higher incentive for its 
implementation, thus contributing to accomplish common interest. When one country 
becomes more productive, it benefits (through demand) the whole EU and raise the 
productivity of the rest of the countries. There also, need to be ensure greater labor mobility 
and flexibility of the common market, that can help the Union to improve the 
competitiveness and also to be able to face adverse shocks in the future much easier.  
Conclusion 
Data for foreign trade of the EU show that the integration process and the introduction of 
the euro had contributed for the Union to become the biggest "trade player " in the world. 
However, there has been a gradual of trading positions of the EU. That is not only a result of 
the economic crisis, but due to the major structural weaknesses (shortcomings) of the EU. 
In other words, the situation in the foreign account is created due to the gap in 
productivity, which led to a real depreciation of the exchange rate in favor of countries that 
have traditionally been exercising surplus. At the same time, most of the other Member 
States of the EU realized permanent foreign trade deficit that, among other things, was a 
result of the large discrepancy between labor productivity and wages, whose ultimate effect 
was perceived in shrinking or stagnant rates of economic growth of these countries. 
It turned out that the economy of EU has a series of structural inconsistencies and 
numerous drawbacks in its economic system. The lack of compliance of the internal policies, 
was one of the most important reasons for the occurrence of asymmetric shocks in the Union, 
reducing the competitiveness of the economy EU and strengthening the negative effects from 
the existing economic crisis. 
Among the Member States of the EU was created gap in prices for homogenous products. 
Even thought, the purpose of the single market was to allow free movement of goods, 
service, capital and labor, the goal was not met due to different price levels. The difference in 
prices and production costs have caused a negative impact on trade flows in the Union. EU 
shows a decrease in market shares on some of the most dynamic importing markets during 
the last decade, especially ASEAN market. The orientation of the trade towards the emerging 
countries can be suggestion for the rest of the member states for faster out of the crisis and 
balanced trade account in the future.  
But on the other hand it is needed to boost the trade relations between EU countries in 
order to gain and improve the trade conditions in the Common Market. Long-term 
expectations and needs for the Common Market is to make a comprehensive structural 
changes in order to overcome structural differences between individual Member States to 
increase the overall competitiveness and individual, to remove trade barriers between 
individual Member States and to achieve higher individual and aggregate rates of economic 
growth. It is clear that the effects of deep integration of the EU has not yet been achieved, 
and expected benefits may not be realized, if the internal and external balance of the Union is 
not achieved. 
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According to our opinion, the EU needs changes in the long term strategy which should 
be oriented towards targeting specific systematic problems of individual member states of 
EU. The reforms need to be make in order to enhance competitiveness, seen as a priority. 
When one country becomes more productive, it benefits (through demand) the whole EU 
and raise the productivity of the rest of the countries. Even thought the relationship between 
labor productivity and market share gain is not straightforward, we tried to point out that 
decreased labor productivity growth in the case of EU influence on the declining share of the 
world market. Firms and industries from EU are facing tough competition from low-cost 
producers (especially from the Asian countries) and therefore they are forced to rationalized 
their production in order to survive. In that direction, the measures need to be oriented 
towards decrease in the employees` protection and higher initiative for regional and mobility 
of the labor force.  
Additionally, if the competitiveness of the Union is not improved, the balance in the 
trade account will be provided by increased unemployment, particularly in certain sectors 
which are uncompetitive. That would mean risk of structural unemployment, i.e. more 
emphatic social crisis that could turn into a political crisis.  
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Konkurentnost Evropske unije: Trendovi pre krize i uticaj 
finansijske krize 
 
 
REZIME – Cilj rada je da se ukaže na rizike od smanjenja konkurentnosti EU analizirajući 
pokazatelje cene koštanja i konkurentnosti, kao i strukturne i tehnološke aspekte konkurentnosti. 
Uticaj svetske krize na konkurentnost i izvozne performanse EU je sve više u fokusu kako bi se ukazalo 
na to koliko globalna kriza može da oteža već postojeće potrebe za sanacijom funkcionisanja Unije. Ne 
samo da je kriza pokazala da problemi u Uniji nisu nedavno nastali, već je nametnula hitne potrebe za 
poboljšanje nove politike kako bi povratila snagu konkurentnosti i performansi. 
Preformulisana strategija treba da se zasniva na otvorenosti i inovacijama, uz ulaganja u 
istraživanje i razvoj. Dugoročny očekivanja treba da budu sveobuhvatne strukturne promene u cilju 
prevazilaženja strukturnih razlika između pojedinih država članica i povećanje ukupne 
konkurentnosti. Pored toga, neophodno je i da se uklone trgovinske barijere pojedinih država članica 
kao i da se postignu više pojedinačne i ukupne stope privrednog rasta. Jasno je da još uvek nisu 
postignuti efekti duboke integracije u EU, a očekivane koristi ne mogu se realizovati ukoliko se interni 
i eksterni bilans Unije ne održava. 
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